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Public Accommodations and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: A Surprising Success?
Brian K. Landsberg1
In 1964, for the first time since the end of Reconstruction,
Congress enacted a law banning race discrimination in public
accommodations, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is
difficult today to understand why this law, which forbade hotels,
restaurants, gas stations, and places of entertainment to discriminate
based on race, color, or national origin, gave rise to such heated
opposition and the longest filibuster in the history of the U.S. Senate.
On its fiftieth anniversary, it seems appropriate to look at the origins
and scope of this law anew and ask: What was the legal and cultural
landscape that helped determine the content of the Act? What
conditions warranted federal legislation governing public
accommodations? What were the objections to the Act? Why were
there such strong law enforcement concerns about compliance with
the Act?
Pursuing these inquiries leads to further questions regarding
the implementation of the Act. First, did Title II achieve
desegregation in the areas it was supposed to address? [My answer
is a slightly qualified yes.] Second, why did compliance come more
readily to this law than to some other areas, such as school
desegregation and fair housing? Today, Title II gets little attention,
while other non-discrimination laws, such as fair employment, fair
housing, and voting rights legislation continue to produce litigation
and garner public attention; yet, in 1963 and 1964, Title II was
considered a key provision, as well as a very controversial one.
Should we be surprised at the success thus far of Title II? Looking

1
Distinguished Professor, Pacific McGeorge School of Law. The author thanks
participants in a Pacific McGeorge workshop and the Hamline Journal of Public
Law and Policy Spring 2014 Symposium for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft. Thanks to Robert Mayville, my research assistant, for his outstanding
assistance. Thanks also to Ryann Sparrow for able editing of the draft.
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to the future, a third question arises from current controversies over
state public accommodations laws, which have become a new
battleground largely because of their application to sexual orientation
discrimination; What, if any, lessons from Title II are transferable to
the state context?
I. THE ORIGINS, SCOPE, AND ANTICIPATED
PROBLEMS OF TITLE II
When it was clear that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would
soon become law, Burke Marshall, the head of the Civil Rights
Division, deployed his lawyers to key southern cities to survey
restaurants. He sent me to Birmingham, Alabama, which had been
the scene of demonstrations, police violence, and the death of four
young girls when the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church was bombed.
Before I began work with the Civil Rights Division in January
1964, I had never been South of the Mason-Dixon line. I had some
limited knowledge of race discrimination in public accommodations,
because I had heard that a privately owned swimming pool in my
hometown of Sacramento had turned away an African-American girl
who had arrived for a birthday party. At this time, however, Alabama
totally segregated public accommodations .2 . Pressure from the
Kennedy Administration had resulted in desegregation of airports,
but, landing at the recently opened Montgomery, Alabama airport, I
noticed that there were two men’s rooms and two ladies’ rooms, all
in close proximity to one another. Upon inquiry, I found out that one
set had been built for whites and the other for African-Americans,

2
Racial discrimination in public accommodations was by no means limited to the
South, but some northern states adopted laws banning such discrimination even
before 1964. In the West people of Chinese, Japanese and Mexican origin often
met discrimination in using public accommodations.
See e.g. MARTHA
MENCHACA, THE MEXICAN OUTSIDERS: A COMMUNITY HISTORY OF
MARGINALIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN CALIFORNIA (1995), A History of
Japanese Americans in California: Discriminatory Practices, HISTORY (Jan. 21,
2015,
8:00
am
PDT),
http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/5views/5views4.htm.
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but pressure from the Kennedy administration had led to the removal
of the racial designations.
For my work with the Civil Rights Division, I walked along
the streets of downtown Birmingham, stopping in at every café, soda
fountain, and restaurant, having a Coca Cola here, a cup of coffee
there, and a visit to the Men’s room in the next. I took notes on the
layout and the menu of each establishment. Though I never did go
off the beaten path to places like Ollie’s Barbecue, and my extensive
notes were never needed, I further observed segregation of public
facilities. I noticed that in restaurants, African-Americans were
served only at the take-out counter.African-Americans were sent to
a balcony in movie theaters. Most hotels rented rooms only to hen I
traveled with African-American attorneys or secretaries, we stayed
in housing on military bases.3
By 1963, civil rights groups had established a right to
desegregation of interstate transportation facilities and had pressed
for stronger civil rights legislation. Maryland, stung by embarrassing
denials of service to African diplomats travelling to Washington, had
become the first Southern state to ban discrimination in public
accommodations, (but only along the Highway 40 corridor.)4 While
some Southern public accommodations voluntarily opened their
doors to African-Americans,5 Attorney General Kennedy thought
that there “was already a terrible problem with the sit-ins and
everything and it was going to get worse and worse and worse and
3
African-Americans have their own memories of the Jim Crow practices. My
colleague Carl Gabel recalls using a pay telephone in a bus station in Georgia to
call a potential black witness; when he hung up, a police officer confronted him,
“Did you know you were using a colored phone?” Sonny Hereford, an engineer
who grew up in Huntsville, Alabama, recalls: “When I was about 4 or 5 years old,
my father had to explain to me why we couldn’t walk into Shoney’s Big Boy
restaurant and order a meal. I knew there was food inside because of the large
statue outside of the boy holding a hamburger up high.” Sonnie Wellington
Hereford IV, My Walk Into History, NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE (Spring 2007),
available at http://magazine.nd.edu/news/9874-my-walk-into-history/.
4
Renee Romano, No Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, the State
Department, and Civil Rights, 1961-1964, 87 J. AM. HIST. 546, 574 (2000).
5
See Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights
Revolution in the American South, HARV. U. PRESS, 2013, at 93.
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had to be dealt with.”6 As a result, when President Kennedy
proposed a new Civil Rights Act in June of 1963, the act included a
ban on race discrimination in Public Accommodations. Kennedy
told the American people, “It ought to be possible for American
consumers of any color to receive equal service in places of public
accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants and theaters and retail
stores, without being forced to resort to demonstrations in the street,
and it ought to be possible for American citizens of any color to
register to vote in a free election without interference or fear of
reprisal.” He said racial discrimination detracted from our standing
abroad, that it led to demonstrations at home, and that it was
inconsistent with the ideals of the United States.
The President’s forceful words disguised concern about the
Public Accommodations title of the bill. The title faced strong
opposition, based on arguments (variously couched) against federal
compulsion to desegregate public accommodations. Opponents
argued that Title II violated the rights of owners of public
accommodations to decide whom to serve, characterizing this as both
an individual right of association and a property right. Relatedly,
they maintained that desegregation would result in monetary loss,
because white customers would no longer patronize businesses once
they desegregated.7 Opponents argued that the proposed law also
deprived customers of the right to choose whom to associate with,8
violated local custom, and i abridged the free exercise of religion.

6
Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, head of the Civil Rights
Division, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 105 (June 20, 1964).
7
“A host follows the customs of his community else he suffers, economically.”
MINORITY COMMITTEE REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 23-340, at 5 (1964),
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2436, 2441.
8
“I think if I did not want to go into a hotel that had mixed patronage, that was a
publicly owned hotel, that I certainly should have the right to go in a privately
operated place that furnished and solicited only those that I chose to associate
with.” Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 1919 (1963) (statement of Edgar S. Kalb, Manager, Beverly Beach
Club).
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Overall, opponents characterized the proposal as federal intrusion
into state and local concerns.
Opposition came from several sources: Southern business
people, politicians, and clergy; some Northern Republicans and
business people; some legal scholars; and extremist groups.
Southern opponents made a variety of arguments. The Attorney
General of Virginia argued that the Ninth Amendment to the
Constitution guaranteed “the right to discriminate in private business
establishments such as those covered by the Civil Rights Law of
1964.”9 The Attorney General of North Carolina argued that the
Commerce Clause was not “designed to destroy the individualism of
the citizens of a state nor to prohibit the social groupings and classes
which are naturally created and molded by personal inclination.”10
Some Southern opponents tended to repeat arguments from the
Brown v. Board of Education cases against overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson. For example, the Fourth Circuit said that segregation
“declares one of the ways of life in Virginia. Separation of white and
colored ‘children’ in the public schools of Virginia has for
generations been a part of the mores of her people.”11 The court also
observed that desegregation would lead to diminished support for
public schools—analogous to the argument that desegregation of
public accommodations would adversely affect white patronage. At
a meeting with President Kennedy, a religious leader from Florida
explained his view that “segregation is a principle of the Old
Testament,” and that “racial integration that would lead to
intermarriage is against the will of their Creator.”12 He later testified
9
Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant
at 7, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 515), 1964
WL 81385.
10
Brief for the State of North Carolina as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 2, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (No. 543), 1964 WL 81102.
11
Davis v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., Va., 103 F.Supp. 337, 339
(E.D. Va. 1952), rev’d Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294
(1955).
12
Rev. Albert Gorner [sic], transcript of Meeting of the President with Religious
Leaders (June 17, 1963), in CIVIL RIGHTS, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT, vol. 9, 106, 115 (Michal R. Belknap ed. 1991) [hereinafter
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before a Congressional committee “that Federal efforts to force
integration as a new social pattern of life is morally wrong, unChristian, and in conflict with the word and will of God as well as
historic Christianity.”13 Other Southerners argued that the law would
violate individual contract rights,14 that legislation could not change
racial attitudes,15 and that Congress should not reward the civil rights
demonstrators.16
Some Republicans agreed with the Southern opponents that
requiring public accommodations to serve African Americans
infringed the liberty of the owners17 and that, in any event, regulation
Belknap]. Religion later became a basis for attacking the constitutionality of the
Act. The owner of a public accommodation argued that Title II infringed his
freedom of religion, “since his religious beliefs compel him to oppose any
integration of the races whatever. The court rejected this claim, because free
exercise of religion “is subject to regulation when religious acts require
accommodation to society.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 256 F.Supp. 941,
943 (D.C. S.C. 1966), rev’d on other grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d
with modifications, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
13
Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 2466 (1963) (statement of Dr. Albert Garner, President, Florida Baptist
Institute and Seminary, Lakeland, Fla.).
14
Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 2138 (1963) (statement of Douglas McKay, Jr. Attorney of Columbia,
S.C., Regarding H.R. 7152 and Related Proposals Concerning Civil Rights
Legislation).
15
Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 2383 (1963) (statement of Jack Lowery, Esq., Attorney, Louisville,
Ky.).
16
Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 2274-75 (1963) (statement of Basil L. Whitener, Member of Congress
from the 10th District of North Carolina).
17
A Washington state supreme court justice had so argued in 1959, dissenting
from a decision upholding the Washinton public accommodations law: “the right
to exclusiveness… is essential to freedom.” Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54
Wash.2d 440, 455 (Wash. 1959) (Mallery, J., dissenting) (discussed in
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, Defending the Right to Discriminate: The Libertarian
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of such places should be treated as a state law issue over which the
federal government had no legitimate power. A representative of the
National Apartment Owners Association echoed Southern arguments
that the proposal would violate property rights and could not change
the moral views of segregationists.18 Barry Goldwater, who became
the Republican nominee for President later that year, argued that the
bill would lead to a police state and threaten “loss of our God-given
liberties.”19 There was a real chance that the Republican leader in
the Senate, Everett Dirksen, would oppose the title and that this could
kill the entire bill.20 An intellectual leader of conservative
Republicans, Robert Bork, argued both that the bill would “selfrighteously” impose the morals of the majority upon a minority,
thereby undermining freedom, and that it was impractical to impose
a law “which runs contrary to the customs, indeed the moral beliefs,
of a large portion of the country.”21 Similarly, New York Times
columnist Arthur Krock argued that “the legislation proposes to
Challenge to the Civil Rights Movement, in SIGNPOSTS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY, 417, 424 (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter
eds., 2013).
18
Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 2252-3 (1963) (statement of Oscar H. Brinkman of the National
Apartment Owners Association).
19
Quoted in RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS 16 (2001). The property rights rationale prevailed with
California voters, who in November 1964 amended the California constitution to
prohibit the state from restricting the right of homeowners to sell to whom they
pleased. The Supreme Court upheld a California Supreme Court ruling that the
amendment was unconstitutional, because intended to overturn laws forbidding
race discrimination in the sale of property. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), discussed in Schmidt, supra note 16, at 437-438 n.83.
20
Memorandum from Senator Mansfield, re meeting with Senator Dirksen (June
13, 1963), in Belknap, supra note 11 vol. 13, at 30; Mansfield-The President (June
18, 1963), in Belknap, supra note 11 vol. 13, at 30 at 33-34.
21
Robert Bork, Civil Rights – A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963,
at 23. Bork later acknowledged that his position had been wrong, because “there
are no general principles to decide competing claims of association and nonassociation.” ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 80 (1990).
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invest the Federal Government with vast, new and penal limitations
of individual freedom of choice.”22
Racist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan not only opposed the
bill, but intimidated business owners who wanted to desegregate. In
Ohio, a Klan leader told a Klan rally that “if our President, our
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white
Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some
revengence taken.”23 Another objection, advanced by legal scholar
Alfred Avins24 and embraced by Senator Strom Thurmond, claimed
that Title II would violate the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on
involuntary servitude.25
The Kennedy administration faced a legal policy issue. The
Supreme Court had held the Civil Rights Act of 1875
unconstitutional, because neither the Thirteenth nor Fourteenth
Amendment authorized Congress to ban private discrimination in
public accommodations.26 The Administration was faced with a
question: “Should it ask the Court to overrule the Civil Rights Cases
or should it instead draft legislation that relied on the Commerce
Clause to confer authority on Congress to ban discrimination in

22
Arthur Krock, In The Nation: Intolerance in the Pursuit of Tolerance, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, May 14, 1964.
23
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). He made the speech a week after
the Senate approved the House bill, with amendments. It became law a few days
later. Id.
24
“Thus, we now find, a century after Negroes were freed from the involuntary
servitude of cutting the hair of whites, a demand from their descendants that whites
be forced by law to cut their hair.” Alfred Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal
Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on Anti-discrimination
Legislation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1964).
25
George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, The Power of Congress, and
the Shifting Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112 COLUMBIA L.REV. 122 (2012) (citing
110 Cong. Rec. 7917–22 (1964) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (quoting
memorandum of Alfred Avins)). Representative Howard W. Smith, citing the
Thirteenth Amendment, proposed to amend the bill by exempting persons from
rendering labor or service without his consent. The proposed amendment was
defeated. TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO PRESIDENTS,
TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 191 (2014).
26
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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public accommodations?” In a controversial move, the Attorney
General decided to rely on the Commerce Clause and not the
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment; however, in Congress, even
the proponents of the bill were reluctant to rest on the Commerce
Clause. A highly respected constitutional law professor, Gerald
Gunther, wrote to the Department of Justice that “the proposed end
run by way of the commerce clause seems to me ill-advised in every
respect.” He argued that “the aim of the proposed anti-discrimination
legislation . . . is quite unrelated to any concern with national
commerce. . ..”27 Similarly, Senator Pastore from Rhode Island
objected, “I believe in this bill, because I believe in the dignity of
man, not because it impedes our commerce.”28 Believing that the
Commerce Clause provided solid support to the ban on
discrimination by public accommodations and that the Supreme
Court was unlikely to overturn the Civil Rights Cases, the Kennedy
administration relied on commerce rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment, as does Title II as finally enacted.29 The Supreme Court
rejected claims that the Commerce Clause did not authorize the
legislation and that the Thirteenth Amendment forbade it.30
The Kennedy administration also had to decide on the scope
of the proposed law. Should the law be limited to large-scale and
multi-state chain establishments or should it cover all? As finally
adopted, Title II covered almost all hotels and motels, restaurants,
gas stations, and entertainment venues, with exceptions for transient
lodgings with less than six rooms and for bona fide private clubs.
This virtually universal coverage facilitated compliance by removing
the fear that, if a public accommodation desegregated, its customers
Letter from Gerald Gunther, Professor of Constitutional Law, Standford Law
School, to the Department of Justice (June 5, 1963) (quoted in GERALD GUNTHER
& NOEL T. DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 336 (8th ed. 1970)).
28
Hearing on S. 1732, Before the S. Commerce Comm, 88th Cong. 252 (1963)
(statement of Sen. John O. Pastore, Senator from Rhode Island).
29
See REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 114-117 (2006)
(providing an account of the arguments in Congress for and against Title II).
30
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
27
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could flee to one that remained segregated.31 The exception for small
transient lodgings was based upon an understanding that exclusion
by a hotel or motel and exclusion by a small lodging place “carry
different social meanings. While a tired black family might bitterly
resent Mrs. Murphy’s decision, they would understand themselves as
victims of her personal choice—-and this is categorically different
from the institutionalized humiliation imposed by a hotel clerk who
rejects them. . ..”32
Burke Marshall deployed Civil Rights Division lawyers to
survey southern public accommodations because he, the Attorney
General, and the President harbored fears that violence would
accompany black efforts to use public accommodations on a footing
of equality. They had ample reasons for their concern. Jim Crow
was engrained in the culture of the Deep South; the Supreme Court
had blessed racial segregation in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy.
The Civil Rights Cases had invalidated the 1875 federal law banning
race discrimination in public accommodations, holding that neither
the Thirteenth nor Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
authorized the legislation. The Court had distinguished social rights
from civil rights and also said that African-Americans could not lay
a claim to be “special favorite[s] of the law.”33 In Plessy, the Court
had denied a right of “enforced commingling of the two races” and
had said that the white race was superior to the Negro race. 34 In the
Deep South, state law required restaurants, hotels, and other public
accommodations to segregate the races. It had been only a few years
since the federal courts had held these laws unconstitutional, and the
custom that the law required remained ingrained.
While Marshall may not have shared the commonly held
belief that the government could not legislate morality, he must have
harbored some doubts about the ability of the law to displace the

See GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 94-95 (2013).
32
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 142
(2014).
33
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
34
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551, 560 (1896).
31
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deep-seated culture of Jim Crow. Widespread noncompliance could
lead to an enforcement nightmare. The Civil Rights Division had
found it necessary to sue one county after another to enjoin racial
discrimination in voter registration. The delays resulting from
piecemeal and interminable litigation led to the adoption of the
Voting Rights Act the following year. If it was difficult to enforce
laws against voter discrimination against, for example, the 67
Alabama county boards of registrars, how much more difficult would
it have been if thousands of public accommodations chose not to
comply with Title II? School desegregation provided another
example; although the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education
in 1954, most public schools in the Deep South remained segregated
ten years later, and desegregation had often been accompanied by
violence.
Marshall was well aware that when African Americans had
asserted their rights under rulings that interstate busses must be
integrated, they and their white companions had met extreme
violence at the hands of Ku Klux Klan types —- the burning of a
Greyhound bus, the beatings and jailings of Freedom Riders.35 He
had been intimately involved with desegregation of the University of
Mississippi pursuant to federal court order and the resulting white
riot that required the U.S. military to intervene. He had sought peace
in Birmingham, which was often called “Bombingham” because of
the violent resistance there to African-American rights.36 He knew
that businesses had refused service to participants in lunch counter
sit-ins, that angry whites had attacked participants, and that local law
enforcement had then arrested those same participants.
Violent reactions to African-American use of publicly owned
facilities even extended to the ocean shore. Violence against Martin
Luther King and others for using the public beach at St. Augustine

TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 195463 at ch. 11 (1989) (describing vividly the saga of the Freedom Riders).
36
DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA: THE
CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 72 (2002).
35
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continued up and past the date of passage of the Act,37 even though
(several years earlier) the Supreme Court had made clear that the
government could not maintain segregated public facilities. These
reactions were both an impetus for the Act and warning signals of
what might await the nation if the Act became law and AfricanAmericans asserted their rights under it. The month before the Act
became law, three civil rights workers were murdered in
Philadelphia, Mississippi, adding to concern that violence would
accompany efforts of African-Americans to use public
accommodations. Governor Paul Johnson of Mississippi predicted
that the Act would “divide the people” and result in “civil strife and
chaotic conditions.”38
President Johnson signed the Act on July 2, 1964, just before
the July 4th weekend. His speech to the nation when he signed the
Act implicitly addressed many of the nation’s concerns. He argued,
as had President Kennedy, that the law represented fundamental
morality, appealing as well to religion: “those who are equal before
God shall now also be equal in the polling booths, in the classrooms,
in the factories, and in hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, and other
places that provide service to the public.”39 He emphasized that the
law was not based on rancor, but on “principles of our freedom,” so
“We must not approach the observance and enforcement of this law
in a vengeful spirit.”40 Responding to critiques of the law, he argued
that it gives no special treatment to any citizen and that it “does not

37
See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-65
at 33-40, 337-340 (1998). On June 28, 1964, the leader of an Ohio Ku Klux Klan
chapter threatened to march on St. Augustine, reflecting that the concerns about
the rights of white men were not limited to the Deep South. Brief of PetitionerAppellant at 6, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (No. 492) 1969 WL
136813.
38
CORTNER, supra note 18, at 29.
39
Lyndon Baines Johnson, Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, MILLER
CENTER: U. OF VA (July 2, 1964),
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3525.
40
Id.
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restrict the freedom of any American, so long as he respects the rights
of others.”41
The Civil Rights Act had created the Community Relations
Service (CRS), based on Congress’ concern about potential conflict
arising from the non-discrimination requirements. The Service was
to assist communities in resolving disputes, disagreements, and
difficulties relating to discrimination. Johnson highlighted the CRS
in his speech, announcing his nomination of former Florida
Governor, Leroy Collins, as its first head.42 He said Collins would
help “communities solve problems of human relations through
reason and commonsense.”43 He had earlier expressed concern that
enforcement would meet with massive resistance, as well as hope
that “we’ve got to have observance rather than enforcement.”44 He
closed with a mini-sermon: “Let us close the springs of racial poison.
Let us pray for wise and understanding hearts. Let us lay aside
irrelevant differences and make our Nation whole. Let us hasten that
day when our unmeasured strength and our unbounded spirit will be
free to do the great works ordained for this Nation by the just and
wise God who is the Father of us all.”45
The immediate response to the enactment of Title II was
widespread compliance, mixed with some serious non-compliance,
cases challenging the constitutionality of the Act, and some violence.
Civil rights historian Taylor Branch recounts that in the months after
the Act passed “visible public separations broke down across the
South in countless pioneer dramas. . .”46
There were definite trouble spots.47 As one might have
expected, one was Selma, Alabama. As recounted by U.S. District
Judge Daniel Thomas,
Id.
Id.
43
CORTNER, supra note 18, at 27.
44
Id.
45
Johnson, supra note 34.
46
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 388; see also ZIETLOW, supra note 26, at 122.
47
WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 97-98 (showing that “In many localities, the first
reaction of proprietors was often open defiance,” but “[w]ithin two or three years,
the overwhelming majority of establishments were committed to compliance.”).
41
42
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About 3:00 p.m., on July 4, 1964, four Negro college students
(two male and two female), who were in Selma in connection with
the literacy project, attempted to obtain service at the Thirsty Boy
Drive-In. The owner called Sheriff Clark, although his normal
practice was to call the city police. The sheriff and several deputies
arrived. A form affidavit was handed to the proprietor to sign; the
warrants charging trespass after warning were already partially
completed. The four Negro students were arrested, . . .; one of the
students had an additional charge of resisting arrest lodged against
him when he responded to the electrical shocks; another had placed
against her an additional charge of carrying a concealed weapon— a
bicycle chain and padlock. All four of these Negro students were
required to answer a two-page questionnaire about their civil rights
activities. All were lodged in jail.
Later on July 4 between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., ten to fifteen
Negro teen-agers, after purchasing tickets and securing permission
of the management, entered the formerly white section of Selma’s
Wilby Theatre; this was the first time an attempt had been made to
desegregate the theatre. At the time of this occurrence, city police,
deputy sheriffs and ‘possemen’ patrolled the theatre area; around
5:30 p.m., when additional Negroes attempted to enter the theatre,
they were blocked by a group of white citizens; an altercation
occurred, and when police were summoned by the management, the
police, deputies, the sheriff and ‘possemen’ responded; both white
and Negro groups on the outside of the theatre were dispersed.
Several unknown white citizens entered the theatre to remove the
Negroes; the manager advised the Negroes to leave— they did; at
this time some of the sheriff’s deputies were inside the theatre. The
officers— police, sheriff and possemen— did nothing on this
occasion to protect the Negroes in their use or attempted use of this
place of public accommodation; instead, they chased them from the
theatre entrance and stood by while the whites forced them from the
inside. The theatre was closed for the day upon the order of Sheriff
Clark.”48

48

United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965).
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At least six Selma restaurants refused to serve AfricanAmericans.49 The black patrons at the Thirsty Boy were not just
arrested; the Sheriff’s deputies used electric cattle prods in arresting
them.50 Similarly, in St. Augustine, Florida, restaurants denied
service to African-Americans, who also were assaulted by whites,
including members of the Ancient City Gun Club.51
However, many public accommodations peacefully
desegregated. For example, African-American lawyer Solomon
Seay tells the story of his family’s outing to the Elite Café in
Montgomery, Alabama around 5:30 on July 2, 1964.52 The Seay
family sat at a table, but the servers ignored the family. Mr. Seay
asked the manager whether they would be served and was told that
the President was expected to sign the Civil Rights Act at 6:20 pm.
“We would be served at 6:20 P.M., and not one minute before, he
added.”53 I was able to experience this shift myself when another
white Civil Rights Division attorney and I took two African
American secretaries to lunch at the Holiday Inn in Montgomery,
Alabama. We got approving smiles from the doorman and bellmen
and disapproving scowls from the waitresses, but we were served
without incident, in contrast to the treatment of the African
Americans at the Thirsty Boy (fifty miles away) in Selma.
Desegregation of public accommodations gained acceptance
more readily in urban centers than in rural areas. In early 1965,
African Americans in the small towns of Marion and Uniontown,
Alabama met resistance when they tried to desegregate local
restaurants. That summer, a group of African Americans set out to
integrate the Gulf Café in Morton, Mississippi. The Chief of Police
threatened them with his pistol and beat up two of them. The
United States v. Warren Co., 10 RRLR 1293 (SD Ala. 1965) (three judge district
court; citations to RRLR refer to the Race Relations Law Reporter).
50
In preparing for the trial of the case, I gave myself a mild jolt with an electric
cattle prod. Never again will I do that!
51
Williams v. Connell and Bolden v. Allen, 9 RRLR 1427, and Plummer v. Brock,
9 RRLR 1399 (M.D. Fla. 1964).
52
I knew the Elite [pronounced ee’-light] as the hangout for Alabama politicians,
judges, and lawyers.
53
SOLOMON SEAY, JIM CROW AND ME 22 (2008).
49
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Department of Justice charged him with the crime of willfully
depriving individuals of civil rights under color of law,54 but he was
ultimately acquitted.
II. SUCCESS OF TITLE II
The Supreme Court upheld Title II’s application to hotels and
motels and restaurants on December 14, 1964, six months after the
law took effect.55 A year after the law went into effect, the Attorney
General’s annual report noted: “Voluntary compliance with Title II
has been most gratifying. Places of public accommodation have been
voluntarily desegregated . . . in [such cities as Birmingham, Jackson,
New Orleans, Jacksonville, and Savannah].”56 The report also noted
that where there were complaints of non-compliance “in the majority
of instances institution of an investigation by the FBI has led to
compliance. Only a minority of cases have required litigation.”57
The following year, the report noted “a high incidence of
voluntary compliance . . . in cities and urban areas, but significant
patterns of non-compliance . . . in rural areas in several Southern
states.”58 One important case enjoined an association of 122
restaurant owners in the Shreveport, Louisiana market from refusing
equal service to African-Americans based on the pretext that they
were private clubs.59 The website for the Civil Rights Division
shows the Division bringing only 21 public accommodations cases

54
ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. at 203 (1966). The incident is described in detail in
Frank Schwelb,
Mississippi in the Sixties and Other Experiences: The Contemporary Memoir of a
Justice Department Civil Rights Lawyer (2012), available at
http://judgeschwelbcivilrightsmemoir.com/Index2.htm/Welcome.html,
55
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
56
Annual Report of the Attorney General for 1965, 182.
57
Id.
58
Annual Report of the Attorney General for 1966, 207.
59
United States v. N.W. La. Rest. Club, 256 F.Supp. 151 (W.D. La. 1966).
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in the past thirteen years, while bringing 57 fair lending cases during
the same period.60
Once compliance was generally established, secondgeneration issues arose. Most of these issues resulted from ambiguity
in the law regarding implementation. For example: Were amusement
parks covered? Were drive-ins covered if most of their wares were
sold for consumption off premises? What about pizza delivery
companies? What establishments qualified for exemption as bona
fide private clubs? How were plaintiffs to prove their case? When
night clubs select who may enter, what will be proof of
discrimination? Must the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent, or
does proof of disparate impact shift the burden to the defendant to
justify the impact? At present, the courts have answered many, but
not all, of these questions.
I do not want to leave the impression that there are no
problems. Derrick Bell has shown that racial discrimination in public
accommodations is not dead; Title II does not cover every public
accommodation.61 For example, Bell mentions taxi drivers who will
not take African-American passengers —- a violation of local
regulation of cabs, but hard to prove and enforce, and not a violation
of Title II. The bona fide private club exception in Title II allows an
unknown number of establishments to discriminate based on race.62
In addition, more subtle forms of discrimination undoubtedly exist
and are more difficult to discover and to prove in court.
Today, hardly any public accommodation will say to a
prospective customer, “we don’t serve blacks.” Bell mentions slow
service, confining minorities to less desirable tables or motel rooms,
discrimination in application of disco dress codes, and differential
fees, as examples.63 Some of the Department of Justice (DOJ) cases
The Civil Rights Division, Housing & Enforcement Cases, THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Jan. 21, 2015, 4:00 PM),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/caselist.php#pa.
61
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 579 (6th ed. 2008).
62
“[T]housands of ‘bona fide’ clubs and organizations…continue policies and
practices that deny the personal dignity of all blacks simply because they are not
open to all whites.” Id.
63
Id. at 570-73.
60
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fall into this category, and a few of these cases become nationally
publicized in news stories. For example, discriminatory service to
black Secret Service agents by a Denny’s Restaurant in Annapolis,
Maryland became a cause celebre, and a DOJ investigation and
several lawsuits led to Denny’s agreeing to pay $45 million to over
4,500 victims of discrimination.64 Latent racial attitudes have not
been eliminated, as current voting controversies remind us. It is
always possible that the attitudes could resurface in public
accommodations as well, though the recent recession did not bring
new life to race discrimination in public accommodations.
The most integrated institutions in the U.S. today are our
public accommodations. One who goes to a café in a Southern town
today would find blacks and whites (who attend or work at largely
segregated schools, live in segregated residential areas, and attend
different churches) sitting at adjacent tables or even the same table,
seemingly without even noticing. The demonstrators who were
treated as criminal trespassers when they engaged in sit-ins at lunch
counters are now treated as heroes.
Why did Title II succeed, while school desegregation and fair
housing, not to mention voting rights (which ordinary nondiscriminatory laws had failed to protect,) continued to meet such
resistance,?
One answer may be the nature of public
accommodations. They are, as the name suggests, accommodations
that are open to the public. In a sense, Title II restored the common
law principles that, “At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others
who ‘made profession of a public employment,’ were prohibited
from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer.”65
Id. at 572.
Justice Kennedy, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1995) (quoting Hurley
v. Irish–American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
571 (1995)). The Senate Report on the Civil Rights Act noted, “In the 17th century,
Lord Chief Justice Hale expressed the authority that the public, through its
Government, can exert over commercial enterprises dealing with the public:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to
make it of public consequence and to affect the community at large. When,
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he
in effect, grants to the public an interest in the use, and must submit to be controlled
64
65
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Moreover, public accommodations are businesses whose owners
hope to turn a profit. Once all were forbidden to discriminate, they
profited from an expanded customer base. Initial predictions that
business would decrease proved wrong. Indeed, many in the
Southern business community welcomed Title II for eliminating a
barrier to non-Southern investment in the South.66
Voting and school segregation lay at the heart of the racial
caste system and were the keys to continued inequality. Public
accommodations lay at the periphery.67 While attendance at school
is compulsory, use of public accommodations tends to be voluntary.
While schools place students into close socialization and mixing of
social classes, socialization is not implicit in use of many public
accommodations, such as hotels and restaurants. Moreover, public
accommodations tend to appeal to various social classes, so upscale
places get upscale customers and chains (such as Dennys) attract the
masses. Where public accommodations do lead to more chance of
socialization, such as swimming pools and night clubs, the
desegregation process has confronted more problems. Especially at
the beginning of school desegregation, whites feared having their
children taught by black teachers; the relationship between customer
and wait staff is much different than that between teacher and
student. As is strikingly dramatized in Lorraine Hansberry’s A
Raisin in the Sun, whites feared that desegregated neighborhoods
would decline in value and that fear often became a self-fulfilling

by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.
He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains
the use, he must submit to the control. (1 Harg.LawTracts 78, cited with approval
by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877)).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 88-872, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2363-.
66
See Clay Risen, The Bill of the Century: The Epic Battle for the Civil Rights Act
247, BLOOMSBURY PRESS (2014).
67
A year after Title II was enacted Bayard Rustin observed, “in desegregating
public accommodations, we affected institutions which are relatively peripheral
both to the American socio-economic order and to the fundamental conditions of
life of the Negro people.” Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics, in BLACK
PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 444, 445 (August Meier, Elliott
Rudwick, & Francis L. Broderick eds., 2nd ed. 1971).
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prophecy. By contrast, the fear that desegregation would devalue
public accommodations was quickly overcome by the facts.
Additionally, desegregation of public accommodations has
not raised the same issues of remedy as other civil rights laws. “It
has not stirred up questions about racial preferences and quotas as
did affirmative action and busing. Nor has it prompted federal
bureaucrats to construct formulas for providing racial balance in
schools and employment.”68 Similarly, “it’s a lot easier for
individual blacks to identify discrimination in this sphere—-either
they are denied service entirely or they are shunted to the back of the
movie theater.”69
Stripping away the rhetoric, opponents had made basically
two arguments against the public accommodations law. The first was
abstract— the law interfered with property rights— but many
accepted laws already interfered with the right to use one’s property
as one wished, such as zoning laws, the law of nuisance, and health
laws. Moreover, the common law had imposed a duty on owners of
public accommodations to serve all respectable customers. The
second argument, which the lower court in the Ollie’s Barbecue case
adopted, was that desegregation would cause economic loss to the
public accommodations, as whites refused to use desegregated
restaurants and hotels. This argument proved factually incorrect.
Many owners of public accommodations welcomed the law,
regarding desegregation as a means to economic gains by opening up
the market. Even Ollie’s Barbecue saw increased, not decreased,
business once it opened its doors to African-Americans.70
The Supreme Court unambiguously upheld Title II. Thus, all
three branches of government supported the right to use public
accommodations free from racial discrimination. The Supreme Court
and Congress have been much less supportive of school
desegregation. Title IV of the 1964 Act places restrictions on the

CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: RACIAL DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 82 (revised 2009), available at
http://www.crmvet.org/info/nps_public_accom.pdf.
69
ACKERMAN, supra note 29, at 172.
70
CORTNER, supra note 18, at 188.
68
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Attorney General’s authority to sue to desegregate the schools, while
Title II allows the Attorney General to sue whenever a public
accommodation engages in a pattern or practice of racial
discrimination. While the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of
1974 lifted the restrictions on the Attorney General’s authority to sue
for school desegregation, Congress made clear in that act that the
neighborhood school was “the appropriate basis for determining
public school assignments,”71 even though residential segregation
continues to separate the races.
III.

CONCLUSION

What significance can we draw from experience under Title
II? There are at least two lessons one may draw from this experience.
Surely one important lesson is that legislation can have a major
impact on morality. The moral code of the Deep South and many
other areas of the United States held that blacks and whites should
not eat in the same restaurants, sleep in the same hotels, swim in the
same pools, or play in the same amusement parks. While there is a
fringe that continues to hold these beliefs, the vast majority of
Americans now think it is immoral to exclude individuals from
public accommodations based on race. Gavin Wright points out that
desegregation was accompanied by marked economic progress in the
South, and he suggests that this progress helps explain “the dramatic
decline in Southern white support for strict segregation between 1961
and 1968. . ..”72 Randall Kennedy has observed that “the ethos of the
law has helped to change hearts and minds and conduct in a fashion
beyond what many sit-in protesters would ever have initially
imagined.”73 Although the main impetus for Title II stemmed from
discrimination against African-Americans, Title II successfully
outlawed discrimination based on national origin and religion as
well, overcoming exclusion of Hispanics, Asians, Jews, Moslems.
20 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2) (1974).
WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 103.
73
Randall L. Kennedy, Struggle for Racial Equality in Public Accommodations,
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 161 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).
71
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It is worth further study to inquire why this law was so
successful in, first, changing behavior, and, second, changing the
prevailing moral code. Sam Bagenstos argues that Title II also
represents rejection of the Nineteenth Century distinction between
civil rights and social rights, which had marked what Robert Post and
Reva Siegel call “a sphere of associational freedom in which law
would allow practices of race discrimination to flourish.”74 Futher,
Richard Epstein is troubled that Title II has served as a model for
more sweeping legislation, especially at the state and local level, that
both covers many businesses that are not covered by Title II and
protects more groups from discrimination. He suggests that “the
resurgence of Title II-type obligations under modern ‘human rights
laws’ indicates a serious and regrettable reversal of fortune. . ..”75
The battle over the legitimacy of coercing action based on one’s view
of morality continues, but there is no dissent from the proposition
that the Act did change the way Americans think about race
segregation of public accommodations.76
Today, the public accommodations issue is arising in a new
context. Some business owners object to laws that require them to
provide their services to same-sex couples. They say that these laws
impinge on their free exercise of religion or their right of nonassociation, replicating arguments that had been made against Title
II. This argument was long ago rejected as a ground to invalidate

Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public
Accommodations Law, 6 STAN.L.REV. 66 (forthcoming 2014) (quoting Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protedtion by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislations After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 490 (2000)).
75
Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of
1964:
Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 6
STAN.L.REV.(forthcoming 2014).
76
The morality enforced by Title II is partly grounded in the history of the racial
caste system in the United States and partly grounded in the libertarian principle,
articulated by John Stuart Mill. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
Although Rand Paul has argued that the public accommodations law violates
libertarian principles, Mill’s ideas allow government to regulate conduct that harms
others.
74
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Title II.77 The case that has drawn particular attention is Elane
Photography v. Willock,78 where a wedding photographer was held
liable under New Mexico’s antidiscrimination law for refusing to
photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony. In rejecting claims
that the application of the law to Elane violated the photographer’s
rights of free speech and association and of free exercise of religion,
the New Mexico Supreme Court relied in part on Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States,79 which had rejected the argument that
Title II imposes involuntary servitude on owners of public
accommodation (in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.) The
court relied on a distinction between commercial and private activity.
Justice Bosson, concurring, observed, “In the smaller, more focused
world of the marketplace, of commerce, of public accommodation,
the [proprietors] have to channel their conduct, not their beliefs, so
as to leave space for other Americans who believe something
different.”80 The court held that Title II does not cover wedding
photographers and does not protect against discrimination based on
sexual orientation. At the same time, however, the court did not
answer the question of whether Title II stands as a precedent for
upholding from broader statutes such as New Mexico’s or whether
the limited scope of Title II’s coverage distinguishes it from these
newer state laws.81
The implementation of Title II has also proven that law can
be a force for economic improvement by enlarging markets.
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 256 F.Supp. 941, 943 (D.C. S.C. 1966),
rev’d on other grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d with modifications, 390
U.S. 400 (1968). While this district court ruling is often cited in briefs, the
rejection of the free exercise of religion argument has not yet been cited by courts.
Id.
78
Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
79
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
80
Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 80 (Bosson J. concurring).
81
See Bagenstos, supra note 60, and Epstein, supra note 61. The competing views
are well summarized in Note, Constitutional Law -- First Amendment -- New
Mexico Supreme Court Holds That Application of Public Accommodations Law to
Wedding Photography Company Does Not Violate First Amendment Speech
Protections. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), 127
Harv.L.Rev. 1485 (2014).
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Segregation excluded over 25% of the potential market from public
accommodations, and Title II expanded the potential market by
adding African-Americans into the customer base. While this would
seem to be an obvious application of classic economic theory,
opponents of the Act had prophesied that desegregation would be
economically destructive. The economist, Gavin Wright, finds that
experience under Title II presents “a remarkable example of
collective co-evolutionary learning towards a better economic
outcome.”82 In line with the theory of the Justice Department
(embraced by the Supreme Court,) Title II removed “‘an artificial
restriction on the market’ [that] interfered with the flow of
merchandise.”83
Experience under the Act validates the controversial decision
of the Kennedy Administration to rely on the Commerce Clause as
the constitutional basis for Title II. This decision then became the
basis for a federal law that not only bans discrimination in public
accommodations against the disabled, but also requires that the
public accommodations make reasonable accommodations to the
needs of disabled customers.84 The Supreme Court has narrowed the
scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers in recent years by
excluding from Congress’ power non-economic activity with a
remote nexus to commerce and inactivity, even if it has a
demonstrated nexus with commerce.85 Experience under Title II,
however, demonstrates that the Commerce Clause ground for social
legislation retains vitality when applied to economic activity.
At present, as Gavin Wright notes, discrimination against
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) persons in the
southern states deters high-technology business.86 Title II, unlike
WRIGHT, surpa note 4, at 101.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1964).
84
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1990). Indeed, the
1964 Act “represents a paradigm for congressional action to protect the rights of
the American people.” ZIETLOW, supra note 26, at 123.
85
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
86
WRIGHT, surpa note 4, at 263 (citing James B. Stewart, Intolerance May Carry
a Price for States, N. Y. TIMES, May 12 [should be 11], 2012).
82
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other key portions of the 1964 Act, has never been amended. Should
Title II be expanded to protect GLBT persons from discrimination in
public accommodations? To answer that question would require
further inquiry into the extent of discrimination by hotels,
restaurants, gas stations and places of entertainment. Most likely the
discrimination occurs more in employment opportunities and in nonrecognition of marriages and in activities, such as photography, not
covered by Title II.
Related to the first two lessons – impact of the law on
morality and impact on economy - Derrick Bell links interestconvergence theory with the experience under Title II. Bell’s
discussion of Title II focuses on its shortcomings, while
acknowledging that “the public generally assumes that [exclusion of
blacks from public accommodations] is no longer acceptable.”87 Bell
argues that throughout American history, significant advances for
blacks came “from policies that were intended to, and had the effect
of, serving the interests and convenience of whites rather than
remedying racial injustices against blacks.”88 Experience under Title
II shows that whites do benefit from non-discrimination in public
accommodations, so the convergence of white economic interests
and black interests in equal treatment helps explain the general
success of Title II. This also suggests another question, though. Is it
not probable that complete eradication of race discrimination from
American life would benefit both whites and people of color? Is it
possible to convince whites that they would be better off without
racial disparities in education, employment, and business?
One can expect the lessons of Title II to guide courts and
policy makers alike as new conflicts arise between the demands of
equality and other values and as Commerce Clause legislation is
considered.
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BELL, supra note 48, at 570.
Id. at 25.

